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“The Argentine Banking and Exchange rate crisis of 2001: Can we 
learn something new about Financial Crises?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
After more than ten years under a Currency Board regime, successful in abating inflation and ensuring 
macroeconomic and financial stability, in January 2002, the country was forced to abandon the 
“Convertibilidad” and moved to a floating exchange regime.  
Is this twin crisis different from those experienced by Argentina in 1995 or earlier in the 1980’s? A 
remarkable difference from past experiences was the apparent strength of the Argentine Financial System, 
as a consequence of deliberate and systematic process of reforms that put its regulatory framework close 
to those of developed countries. However, the crisis revealed  two sources of financial fragility ´probably 
underestimated during the good times. First,  the combination of a currency board regime and highly 
dollarized banks’ balance sheets implied a solvency risk for the financial system in case the economy had 
to adjust to a shock either trough a nominal devaluation or a deflationary process. The other hidden risk 
for the financial system was the non regulated exposure of banks to sovereign risk. 
 
Using a dynamic panel data model we study the behavior of individual banks’ deposits during the 
prolonged twin crisis suffered by Argentina since November 2000. Our aim was to determine if this event 
could have been  a “sun spot” phenomenon, i.e. a random event not related to the real economy or the 
consequence of a change in economic agents perception about the trend of the Argentine economy., i.e. 
an increase on aggregate risk.  
 
Our results strongly favour the second hypothesis. “Macro fundamentals” like devaluation risk, the EMBI 
spread, the change in international reserves and the change in industrial production, played an important 
roll in explaining the behavior of deposits during the crisis. On the contrary , banks’ “fundamentals” did 
not help to explain the dynamics of deposits in this crisis, with the exception of a leverage ratio. We also 
introduced the interest by individual banks on deposits, to test if depositors took it as an indicator of 
banks’ strength, flying more intensely from banks that paid higher interest rates to retain deposits. The 
results for the complete sample period confirm this intuition. The share of government debt holdings in 
banks’ portfolio was also significant for one of the sub periods of the sample, confirming that banks that 
were large lenders of the government were subject to a more intense run.  
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1. Introduction 
 
After more than ten years under a Currency Board regime that was successful in abating 
inflation and ensuring macroeconomic and financial stability, in January 2002, 
Argentina abandoned the “Convertibilidad” and moved to a floating exchange rate 
regime, in the middle of the probably most deep political and institutional crisis 
experienced by the country in years. 
Are these twin crises different from the Tequila crisis of 1995 or those suffered by 
Asian countries in 1997, or the ones experienced by Argentina and other Latin 
American countries during the 1980’s?  
A strikingly distinguishable feature of the 2001 Argentine crisis was  the apparent 
strength of the Argentine Financial System. After the adoption of the “Convertibilidad” 
in 1991, Argentina implemented a deep financial reform including a financial 
liberalization. At the same time, strong prudential regulations were introduced, putting 
the Financial System close to Basle recommendations. The country benefited from 
those reforms, being nearly immune to financial contagion during the Asian and the 
Russian crisis. 
The main purpose of this paper is to determine the nature of the banking crisis of 2001 
analyzing the behavior of daily changes in individual bank’s deposits. We estimate a 
dynamic panel data model  to study what drove the dynamics of deposits. To what 
extent the run was caused by the perception of depositors of an increasing aggregate risk 
rather than a run on a particular kind of banks, probably more exposed to currency risk 
than others because of the composition of their balance sheets or because of their 
ownership (being foreign banks probably perceived less vulnerable than domestic). We 
also want to asses determine if those banks that were large lenders of the Argentine 
government were subject to a more intense withdrawal than others.  
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we revise the literature on banking crisis, 
in section 3 we briefly describe the main features of the banking crisis during the 
different sub-periods we have identified. In section 4 we describe the model to be 
estimated and present the econometric results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Bank panics in the literature 
 
A considerable amount of  theoretical and empirical research has been devoted to 
explain the phenomenon of bank panics2. Most of the theoretical developments on this 
field ground on the seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). These authors model 
banking crises as random self-fulfilling processes in which individual liquidity needs 
are fed by a kind of misperception of economic agents about other agents’ needs, which 
can eventually lead to a bad equilibrium in which everybody run on banks.  
There is also an alternative theoretical explanation that could probably be of more 
empirical relevance for the Argentine 2001 crisis. In this view bank panics unchain 
because of an increase on aggregate risk. Models in this vein were developed by 
Wallace (1980, 1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Chari and Jagannathan (1988) 
                                                 
2 For a detailed and good  discussion on the main developments in this field  see Freixas and Rochet 
(1998) Chapter 7. 
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and more recently Hellwig (1994) . Recently, Chang and Velasco (2000, 2001) and 
Kawamura (2002) have developed models in this direction, extending this argument to 
an open economy facing “financial illiquidity” as a possible explanation for recent 
international crisis as those of Asia in 1997 or Brazil in 1999.  
A paper by Allen and Gale (1998) is particularly appealing for the Argentine ongoing 
crisis. In their model bank panics are optimal. They are the natural response of 
economic agents to an increase on aggregate risk due to a reduction on asset value 
because of, for example, a downturn in economic activity. In this sense, the anticipation 
by a leading indicator of an imminent recession induces to a deposit withdrawal as a 
response to an expected fall in firms’ asset prices, deteriorating bank’s portfolios.  Thus, 
bank panics are caused by a solvency rather than a liquidity problem. A more recent 
paper by Allen and Gale (2000) is also illuminating for the understanding of the 2001 
Argentine banking and currency crises. They construct an asset pricing model that 
adequately describes the phenomenon of asset price bubbles in which banking crises are 
the result of an increase on some asset prices whose supply is fixed (as can be the case 
of real estate and stocks) fueled by a rapid increase on bank lending. Their model 
emphasizes the roll of financial liberalization in creating asset price bubbles. It 
adequately  replicates  the dynamics of financial liberalization stories that ended in asset 
price collapses, banking crisis and, in some cases, currency crises, like those of 
Scandinavian countries in late 1980’s and early 1990’s or that of Mexico in 1995.  
Another possible source of a banking crises is that of contagion.  New interest on this 
phenomenon as a mechanism through which shocks to a particular country ,or say bank, 
can spread internationally or to the whole banking system in different ways, have raised 
because of the recent financial crisis on emerging markets. This was the case of the 
Mexican crisis of 1995 or the Asian crises of 1997. There is a sun spot explanation of 
“contagion” in which there are some equilibriums that lead to a widespread effect of an 
idiosyncratic shock. On the other hand, contagion could be explained by any positive 
correlation among real shocks in different countries or banks. 
While a wide number of  empirical analysis have been developed on contagion, little 
effort seems to have been devoted to provide a theoretical explanation for the 
“contagion phenomenon”.  A recent paper by Allen and Gale (2000) develops a model 
in which contagion appears due to real links between banks or, in their case, regions. 
Those links can transform small shocks in one region into a widespread crisis. 
A large number of empirical papers test the presence of contagion in recent emerging 
markets crises. For the Argentinean case, Schumacher (1996) uses a binary choice 
model to study the Tequila crisis and finds that while contagion effects were not 
substantial, there is evidence of the presence of market discipline during this crisis. On 
the other hand D’Amato et al. (1998), study the Tequila banking crisis of 1995, looking 
at the dynamics of individual bank deposits during this episode testing for alternative 
hypotheses and find evidence of contagion between group of banks. 
Our guess here is that rather than being a sun spot phenomenon, or a bank panice spread 
to the financial system through  contagion effects, this banking and currency crisis is of 
the second type, i.e. one related to  an increase on perceived aggregate risk. We test the 
validity of this hypothesis using econometric analysis to study the behavior of 
individual bank deposits. We ask several questions that could help to understand what 
drove the crisis: (i) Was the dynamics of deposits explained by movements on 
macroeconomic fundamentals? (ii) Were individual banks’ fundamentals important in 
explaining the behavior of deposits, i.e., did market discipline work, in the sense that 
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differences in individual banks’ strength explain differences in deposit dynamics? (iii) 
Is there any evidence of a flight to quality form banks perceived as more weak or risky 
to those perceived as more solvent or healthy or probably more safe because of being 
foreign owned or to big to fail? (iv) Is there any evidence of contagion effect among 
bank groups? 
 
3. The Argentine 2001-2002 crisis. A new phenomenon or rather more of the 
same? 
 
In January 2002, Argentina abandoned the “Convertibilidad” and moved to a floating 
exchange rate regime in the middle of probably the most deep political and institutional 
crisis experienced by the country in years. The abandoning of the Currency Board was 
just the last step of an agonic process in which the economy, being immersed in a deep 
and prolonged recession since the second half of 1998, gradually lost access to 
international financial markets and suffered during 2001 a banking crisis that the 
government unsuccessfully tried to repress by putting restrictions on deposit 
withdrawals until it finally declared default on its debt. 
Are these twin crises different from the Tequila crisis, or those suffered by Asian 
countries in 1997, or the ones experienced by Argentina and other Latin American 
countries during the 1980’s? As pointed by Chang and Velasco (1998), the 1997 crisis 
in Asian countries, rather than being a new phenomenon, shared common characteristics 
with, for example, the Chilean crisis of 1982 and the Mexican crisis of 1994: market–
oriented economic reforms, trade and financial liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization of public enterprises. They also point out that financial fragility, due to 
inadequate bank regulation and supervision was a main common weakness shared by 
almost all these experiences.3  
A strikingly distinguishable feature of the Argentine case is, however, the apparent 
strength of the Argentine Financial System previous to the crisis. After the adoption of 
“Convertibilidad” in 1991, Argentina implemented a deep financial reform including a 
financial liberalization. At the same time, strong prudential regulations were introduced 
putting the Financial System close to Basle recommendations. The country benefited 
from those reforms, being nearly immune to financial contagion during the Asian and 
the Russian crises. Under macroeconomic stability, the financial liberalization induced a 
rapid credit growth, which fueled not only a consumption boom, but also high 
investment growth. 
However, the ongoing crisis revealed that two potential risks for the financial sector and 
the whole economy were underestimated during the good times of the “Convertiblidad”. 
First, financing to the private sector, which was mainly in dollars, was funding private 
sector domestic borrowers, mainly involved in non-tradable activities. A real exchange 
rate misalignment, corrected either by a deflation or a nominal devaluation could 
severely hurt the solvency of no-tradable sector borrowers, making them unable to 
repay their bank debts. 
The second source of fragility for the financial system was the lack of adequate 
regulation on government debt holdings by banks, either in the form of loans or bonds. 
                                                 
3 See Diaz, A. (1985), for an illuminating and detailed description of the Chilean and Uruguayan cases. 
 6
Under a currency board regime that put restrictions on government financing, the 
regulation of this risk on banks’ portfolios was particularly relevant. 
 
The reversal on capital flows to emerging markets after the Asian and Russian crises 
and the devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999 unchained a prolonged 
recession. After two years of economic downturn, real appreciation of the peso and 
persistent deterioration on fiscal revenues, doubts emerged about the Government’s 
capability of honoring its debt. The perceived devaluation risk also increased, as the 
economy proved to be unable to adjust to different financial and real shocks. It also 
became clear that the combination of a Currency Board regime and highly dollarized 
banks’ balance sheets implied a solvency risk for the financial system in a devaluation 
scenario, that began to be perceived as more probable. This risk was underestimated 
during the “good times” in which the economy grew steadily, fueled by capital inflows, 
favorable terms of trade and a currency relatively devalued vis a vis that of Brazil 
(Argentina’s main trade partner in the region) (Figures 1 and 2). This was one of the 
main reasons why the Tequila crisis did not develop as a twin crisis. All participants, 
foreign and domestic investors, the government, the Central Bank and even Multilateral 
Financial Institutions assigned a nearly zero probability to the event of a devaluation. 
Moreover, the success of the economy on rapidly surpassing the Tequila episode 
converted the Argentinean “Convertibilidad” into a kind of paradigmatic case frequently 
invoked as an example to be followed.  
 
Figure 1: Capital Inflows 
 
Several shocks slowly began to undermine the generalized “optimistic” perception 
about Argentina’s economic trends, which worked for several years coordinating 
participants in a kind of virtuous circle, which finally revealed to be fragile. Successive 
shocks to international financial markets, the Asian crises of 1997 and Russia in 1998 
increased international investors’ risk aversion and led to a reversal in capital flows to 
emerging markets. A recession unchained in Argentina in the third quarter of 1998 and 
deepened after the Brazilian devaluation of January 1999.  
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Figure 2: Multilateral Real Exchange Rate 
 
As the economy proved to be unable to adjust to this change in relative prices (Figure 3) 
through deflation and increasing unemployment, the fiscal position deteriorated and 
confidence of both external and internal investors weakened. A devaluation of the 
currency and a default on government debt began to be perceived as more probable 
events, as reflected on currency and country risk indicators (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 3: Economic Growth, Inflation and Unemployment 
 
A clear indication of how much higher was the perceived macroeconomic risk in this 
crisis compared to Tequila is the completely different behavior of banks’ short term 
foreign credit lines compared to this previous episode (Figure 5). While in Tequila short 
term foreign credit lines worked as an important source of bank financing, in the 
ongoing crisis the deepening in deposits fall was accompanied by a decline, rather than 
an increase in banks’ financing through short term foreign credit lines. The conventional 
knowledge assessment that head offices of foreign owned banks would act as LOLR of 
their local offices was not confirmed by the empirical evidence.  
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Figure 4: Country Risk  
 
Figure 5: Short Term Foreign Credit Lines 
 
Restricted by the “Convertibilidad” in its financing sources, the government tried 
unsuccessfully to increase tax revenues4, a difficult task in the middle of a recession, 
and began to relay on domestic market financing (i.e. banks, money market funds and 
pension funds5). Although government debt became an increasingly risky asset, this 
financing was voluntary. In the middle of a prolonged recession that could probably 
deteriorate the credit quality of domestic private sector borrowers, banks stopped 
lending to the private sector and increased significantly the weight of government debt 
(either in the form of bonds or bank lending) in their asset portfolios (Figure 7). This 
crowding out effect, implied additional financing difficulties for the private sector 
which contributed to exacerbate the economic downturn (Figure 8).  
                                                 
4 One of the first measures included in the package adopted by the economic team that took office with 
President de la Rúa  in 1999 was to increase income taxes. The new package was supported  by the IMF. 
5 It has to be emphasized that in Argentina Pension Funds are mainly related to banks, contrary to what is 
the most common pension funds scheme, in which insurance companies are the ones involved on this  
business. 
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Figure 6: Devaluation Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Public Sector Debt (bonds and loans) as % Banks´ Assets 
(3 month m.a.)  
 
A correction of the real exchange rate misalignment, through either a deflation or a 
devaluation of the currency implied a solvency problem for the financial system, since 
63% of credit to the non-financial domestic private sector (whose income were mostly 
in pesos) was dollar denominated. The high proportion of government debt in hands of 
the banks also implied a solvency risk for the financial sector, given the inability of the 
government to restore confidence and regain access to international markets’ financing. 
Depositors’ confidence on the financial sector weakened as they realized that many of 
the banks would become insolvent in case of a devaluation and or a default on 
government debt. 
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Figure 8:Banks’ loans to the Private and Public Sector  
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3.1. Some relevant features of the crisis 
By the time the “Convertibilidad” had been abandoned, in January 2002, international 
reserves at the Central Bank were 42% lower than those of December 2000, and the 
banking system had lost around 19% of private sector deposits (Figure 9). Contrary to 
the Tequila episode, an external shock that generated a sudden shift in expectations 
leading to a sharp but quick fall in deposits and reserves, this crisis evolved through a 
slowly but persistent erosion of confidence of both domestic and foreign economic 
agents, as they continued to receive persistent and systematic signals that the economy 
was unable to recover from the deep recession it entered by the end of 1998.  
 
Figure 9: Total Private Sector Deposits 
 
The crisis developed through several episodes. We study here the period between July 
2000 and November 2001 in which we identify four sub-periods of deposit withdrawals. 
We consider the November 2000 deposit fall as the initial episode of the crisis, that 
evolved slowly with ups and downs, until a kind of inconvertibility was declared at the 
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end of November 2001, the so called “Corralito”6. It must be said that the crisis has not 
been solved at the moment this paper is written, but after the implementation of the 
“Corralito”, the deposit dynamics is noisy, reflecting the effects of withdrawal 
restrictions, asymmetric pesification and the persistent intend by depositors to avoid 
them in order to preserve their assets’ value. We do not analyze these figures here and 
restrict our analysis to the above mentioned period. 
Figure 9 gives a detail description of the four episodes. The first one was unchained by 
a political event, the resignation of vice president Carlos Álvarez in October 2000. This 
first period goes from the 7th of November 2000 to the 13th of December 2000. The 
announcement of a rescue package, that assured the funds necessary to cover financial 
needs during 2001 transitorily alleviated the fiscal situation and stopped deposit 
withdrawals. 
The second episode took place between the 12th of February 2001 and the 29th of March 
2001. The failure of the rescue package in restoring confidence reflected on a 
pronounced widening of sovereign debt spreads. In March 1st the Economy Minister 
Machinea resigned and Minister Lopez Murphy took office for a short period of time. 
He announced a fiscal adjustment which was not supported by the “alliance” in power 
and had to resign. Minister Lopez Murphy was followed by Dr. Cavallo.  
After Minister Cavallo took office he implemented several measures aiming to improve 
the fiscal position of the government, which was particularly critical, given the scarce 
external market financing and the deepening of the recession, that persistently eroded 
tax revenues. A tax on financial transactions was introduced, which was very easy to 
collect and difficult to avoid, in order to increase tax collection. In addition, in an 
attempt to recover confidence the government instrumented a debt swap with holders of 
government debt, known as the “Megacanje”7. But in July fiscal deficit figures 
indicated that further reductions on government expenditure were needed given the 
sharp decline on tax collection and the lack of external financing. The government then 
announced a zero deficit policy and decided to lower nominal wages of public 
employees by 13%. On the other hand, the government gave signals of the intention of 
making the “Convertibilidad” scheme more flexible by introducing a fixed peg to a 
currency basket that included the dollar and the euro. But these announcements were 
imprecise and generated increasing uncertainty. In addition, several changes were 
introduced to Central Bank’s liquidity policy, which was originally designed with a 
prudential purpose. By using it as a tool of monetary policy , these changes weakened 
confidence on the banking system. 
In July, a much deeper bank run unchained. Two main features of the macroeconomic 
situation are probably relevant in explaining the change of attitude of domestic agents. 
First, the Government lost access to international financial markets and the only source 
of financing were the domestic banking system and pension funds. On the other hand, 
the recognition of an overvaluation of the currency by the economic authorities 
increased uncertainty about the future course of exchange rate policy, given the 
ambiguity of the announcements.  
By the end of August the economic team negotiated a financial aid from the IMF of 
U$S 8 billions to support the financial system. In fact, $4 billions went to the Central 
                                                 
6 Due to the bank run of the 30th November 2001, the Government imposed strong restrictions on deposit 
withdrawals. These restrictions were tightened during the crisis and are still at work.   
7 In June a debt swap was implemented that extended the maturity of some bonds in exchange of a higher 
interest rate. 
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Bank to reinforce international reserves while, at the same time, the contingent repo 
program -designed to provide liquidity to the financial system in case of a systemic 
liquidity crisis- was triggered. These announcement transitorily stopped the deposits 
withdrawal and even reversed its trend, until the first days of October in which the 
release of tax collection figures reveled a significant monthly decline (-11%) and the 
EMBI spread reached a historical peak of 1850 basic points. This was the beginning of 
the final episode that ended the 30th  of November 2001 with the imposition of the so 
called “Corralito”, a kind of deposits inconvertibility which was tightened afterwards. 
 
3.2. A first descriptive approach to the dynamics of deposits 
 
As a first approach to the dynamics of deposits we studied the change in deposits by 
bank groups looking for differences in their performance, which could be an indication 
of flight to quality or contagion effects. Figures 10 and 11 show how the deposits fall 
distributed among the main groups of banks operating at the Argentine banking sector8 
Figure 10:Change in Private Sector Deposit fall by bank groups  
(according to size) 
 
In the first period, 11.08.00 – 12.13.00, private sector deposits at the financial system 
fell 0.67%. If we compare between foreign and domestically owned financial 
institutions it can be seen that domestic banks lost more deposits than foreign. The 
smallest private banks were the ones that lost the most. Thus, the dynamics of deposits 
during this first period give some indication of a kind of “flight to quality” effect.  
                                                 
8 Our analysis excludes wholesale banks, both domestically and foreign owned, as well as public 
provincial banks and non banks because they do not fund their activity mainly with deposits. In the 
specific case of public provincial banks, there was  another  reason, the poor quality of information.  We 
classify retail private banks according to their size in two groups: the five largest and others. A second 
criterion to differentiate banks was their ownership, differentiating two groups: domestic and foreign 
banks. We consider the three largest public banks as another group.  
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Figure 11: Change in Private Sector Deposit fall by bank groups 
 (according to ownership) 
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The fall in deposits during the second episode, 02.12.01 – 03.29.01 was more intense 
than in the first period (-5.82%) but was rather similar according to the behavior of 
groups classified by size. The smallest private retail banks were the group that lost the 
most, followed by the large public banks and the five largest retail banks. If the criterion 
is ownership, foreign owned banks lost more than domestic ones. Thus, average daily 
figures by bank group indicate that depositors flew more intensely from the smallest 
financial institutions, probably perceived as weaker compared to large banks (Tables 1 
and 2). 
 
Table 1: Average daily change in Private Deposits by bank groups  
(according to size) 
 
 
In the third period, 07.04.01 – 08-23-01, 13.02% of total private sector deposits flew 
from banks, suffering the most intense withdrawal of the whole period. But in this case 
the largest banks of the system were the ones that suffered the most significant decline. 
Deposits at the five largest banks fell by 16% while private sector deposits at the largest 
public banks declined 14%. The smallest private banks suffered less withdrawals 
(11.8% and 8.3% respectively). Although foreign banks suffered less deposits 
From 11/08/00 
to 12/13/00
From 2/14/01 to 
3/28/01
From 7/04/01 to 
22/08/01
From 10/03/01 
to 11/30/01
Private Reatail Banks: 
Five Largest
0,012% -0,118% -0,312% -0,224%
Other Private Retail 
Banks
-0,055% -0,179% -0,167% -0,136%
Largest Public Banks -0,015% -0,127% -0,279% -0,067%
 14 
withdrawals, the difference with respect to domestic banks is small. Figures by bank 
groups show that the dynamics of deposits during this episode was completely different 
form the two previous: The flight of depositors was more intense and depositors flew 
from large financial institutions. 
Table 2: Average daily change in Private Deposits by bank groups  
(according to ownership) 
 
Finally, in this last period, in which total private sector deposits fall 9.15%, the five 
largest banks experienced the deepest fall (13.3%). Deposit at the rest of the private 
banks fell 8%, while the largest public banks lost only 3.9%. 
Summing up, it appears that during the first two episodes the smallest financial 
institutions suffered a deeper fall, probably because of being perceived weaker than 
larger banks. The depositors behavior reversed in the two last episodes, where 
depositors flew more intensely form the largest banks of the system. The increasing 
exposure of large banks to public sector debt is probably an explanation of this 
behavior. In the next section we use econometrics to try to answer some of the questions 
raised in section 2. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
As mentioned in section 2, our perception is that the present crisis in Argentina was due 
to an change on aggregate macroeconomic risk rather than one based on the perception 
of weak fundamentals of specific banks. In this sense, the phenomenon we deal with 
here was unchained by an increase in macroeconomic risk, more specifically by an 
increasing perception of private agents that a default on government debt was inevitable 
and that a devaluation of the currency was needed to correct the real appreciation of the 
Argentine peso, which seemed extremely slow and painful if not impossible under the 
“Convertibilidad”. This event differs from the Tequila crisis, which developed as a 
systemic crisis in which specific bank fundamentals played a significant role in 
explaining the dynamics of deposits and there was a flight to quality from small and 
weak financial institutions to others perceived as stronger. 
To determine to what extent this crisis was a bank run based on aggregate risk rather 
than one based on a weakening of individual banks which spread through contagion 
effects, we estimated a dynamic panel data model for daily changes on individual 
banks’ deposits. The model includes bank fundamentals that intend to give account of 
the perceived risk of individual financial institutions, as well as macro variables 
reflecting market perception about aggregate risks, i.e. default risk and currency risk. 
Our estimation strategy was to estimate a model for the whole sample which includes 
all the ups and downs of the crisis, giving a wide view of the process and leading to 
From 11/08/00 
to 12/13/00
From 2/14/01 
to 3/28/01
From 7/04/01 
to 22/08/01
From 10/03/01 
to 11/30/01
Domestic Banks -0.032% -0.126% -0.271% -0.158%
Foreign Owned 
Banks -0.005% -0.144% -0.250% -0.152%
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general results. On the other hand, we estimated models for the four episodes intending 
to capture the particular features of each one. 
To estimate our model we use the Arellano-Bond method, which is based on a GMM 
estimator, given the characteristic of the model: (i) it contains individual effects (ii) it 
includes the lagged dependent variable (iii) it contains non strictly exogenous variables. 
The Arellano-Bond method requires for the parameters to be identifiable the strict 
exogeneity of some of the regressors, conditional on the unobservable individual 
effects.9 Our “macro fundamentals” fulfill this condition. While the use of the Arellano-
Bond method ensures consistent estimation, the atypical structure of our panel which is 
larger in T(time) than in N (individuals), adds a gain in efficiency. 
Our strategy was to proceed in two directions. On the one hand, we estimated a weekly 
version of the model for the whole period (July 2000-November 2001) that allowed for 
wider variability in the data by including periods of ups and downs in deposits. It also 
permitted to include in the model a business cycle indicator, the change in industrial 
production. On the other hand we estimated models using daily data for the four bank 
run episodes described in 3.2 in order to capture the particular features of each episode, 
given the intuition provided by the descriptive analysis.  
We estimate the following model for the change on individual banks’ deposits: 
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Where itdep∆ (Dep Change) is the weekly change in individual banks deposits 
calculated as         log dept - log dep t-1   as  explained by: 
(i) its own past, given the dynamic characteristics of the model. 
(ii) The interest rate on time deposits (Dep Int Rate), which is introduced as a 
predetermined variable that varies across individuals and time. Our hypothesis 
here is that, among other things, this interest rate gives information about how 
risky a bank is compared to others, that is, financial institutions that are in a 
weaker position have to pay higher interest rates on time deposits to attract 
investors. Since there is a strong reason to consider it as endogenous, i. e. banks 
which are loosing deposits will try to attract funds paying higher interest rates, 
we introduce it as a predetermined variable. That is, we assume that 
00),()1(,,....,1,,....,1, >=== + sallforurCovinTtallforniwithibankfor sitit
 
For each bank, the interest rate paid on deposits can be influenced by past 
changes on deposits, but its contemporaneous value can be considered as 
independent of current changes. 
(iii) The Xk variables, which are the exogenous individual banks fundamentals, that 
intend to capture to what extent depositors were able to discriminate between 
                                                 
9 See Arellano and Bond (1991). 
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banks depending on their health in terms of their solvency, liquidity, profitability 
and net wealth.  Variables in this group vary across individuals and time, 
although with a lower frequency (monthly) than the dependent variable, since 
the data to construct the ratios are basically balance sheet variables. These 
fundamentals include:  
The ROE calculated as 12 month cumulative interest and non interest 
income, net of operative and financial costs, to equity. (ROE) 
A leverage ratio calculated as the ratio of net liabilities to net wealth. 
(Leverage). 
The ratio of non performing loans to total loans, as an indicator of the 
credit quality of banks loan portfolios. (NPL) 
A ratio of risky assets to total assets, where risky and total assets are 
those considered by the capital requirement regulation for the calculation 
of capital requirements. (RiskRatio) 
The ratio of government debt to total assets. This variable includes 
banks’ public bond holdings as well as lending to the national, provincial 
and municipal governments. Although it is not a variable traditionally 
considered as a “fundamental” we include it , given the role played by 
banks as main financing source of the government. (Pub Debt) 
(iv) The Wm variables are the “macro fundamentals” that account for changes on 
aggregate risk. Except for the industrial production index (Ind Prod), which has 
a monthly frequency, the macro fundamentals are introduced in a weekly 
frequency and for this reason, can only be included in the the model for the 
whole period. The list of variables included in the set is the following. 
The change on Central Bank international reserves. (IntRes Change) 
The EMBI spread as a measure of changes on perceived country risk. 
(EMBI) 
Devaluation risk measured by the spread of the average interest rate on 
peso denominated deposits and the interest rate on dollar denominated 
deposits. (Deval Risk) 
Aggregate liquidity of the Financial System, given by total liquid assets 
that banks have to hold to fulfill the liquidity regulations of the BCRA. 
There were regulatory changes over this period. At the beginning, the 
BCRA reduced liquidity requirements to provide liquidity to financial 
institutions. In June 2001, liquidity requirements were replaced by 
reserve requirements for sight deposits. (SysLiq Change). 
  
 
 
  
Figure 12: Macro Fundamentals 
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4.1. A model for the complete period with weekly observations  
We first estimated a model  for the whole sample, July 00 –November 01. This long 
period includes sub periods of  ups and downs in deposits. The model was estimated 
with daily data with a  weekly span. Given that high frequency data implies high noise, 
we considered variables significant at the 15% level. 
Table 3:Whole Sample Period – Weekly Observations10 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data                Number of obs      =      1931 
Group variable (i): entidad                     Number of groups   =        28 
 
                                                Wald chi2(15)      =   2906.48 
 
Time variable (t): time                         min number of obs  =        68 
                                                max number of obs  =        69 
                                                mean number of obs =  68.96429 
 
One-step results 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
Dep change   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dep change   | 
          LD |  -.1283631   .0341867    -3.75   0.000    -.1953679   -.0613584 
Dep Int rate | 
          D1 |  -.4983505   .1963032    -2.54   0.011    -.8830978   -.1136033 
Deval Risk   | 
          LD |  -.1318845   .0326713    -4.04   0.000     -.195919   -.0678499 
IntResChange | 
          LD |   .0535516   .0224936     2.38   0.017     .0094648    .0976383 
         L2D |  -.0540206   .0184976    -2.92   0.003    -.0902753   -.0177659 
         L3D |   .0232782   .0134214     1.73   0.083    -.0030272    .0495836 
         L4D |   .0296751   .0172512     1.72   0.085    -.0041366    .0634867 
IndProd(-1)  | 
          D1 |   .1192296   .0705454     1.69   0.091    -.0190368    .2574961 
IndProd(-2)  | 
          D1 |   .1624724   .0966866     1.68   0.093    -.0270298    .3519746 
IndProd(-3)  | 
          D1 |   .1340928   .0774039     1.73   0.083     -.017616    .2858015 
Nov00 Mult   |  -.3772997   .2115558    -1.78   0.075    -.7919414     .037342 
Mar01 Mult   |  -.8265629   .0823339   -10.04   0.000    -.9879343   -.6651914 
Jul01 Mult   |  -.5062182   .1310918    -3.86   0.000    -.7631535   -.2492829 
Nov01 Mult   |  -.4438332   .1331075    -3.33   0.001    -.7047191   -.1829473 
Asymmetry    |  -.5285568   .0506961   -10.43   0.000    -.6279193   -.4291942 
Constant     |  -.0015683    .000551    -2.85   0.004    -.0026483   -.0004883 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Two-step results 
 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:      
         chi2(284) =    14.68     Prob > chi2 = 1.0000 
 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -1.22   Pr > z = 0.2240 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -0.37   Pr > z = 0.7082 
 
Table 3 shows the results of a parsimonious version of our model after several 
simplifications on a general model including all the variables described above and a 
larger lag structure. The model was simplified based not only in the individual 
significance of the variables but also on the evidence of  some multicolineality due to 
                                                 
10 D1 indicates the contemporaneous value of the variable, LD is the first lag, L2D is the second lag, and 
so on.  
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strong correlation among some of the macro variables (see Appendix A). All the 
variables in this final model are significant at 10% level.  
The results give strong evidence that individual banks’  micro fundamentals do not 
contribute to explain the behavior of deposits, except from the interest rate. Its negative 
coefficient confirms the hypothesis that those banks which paid higher interest rates 
were subject to higher deposit withdrawals, probably because of being perceived as 
more risky.  
On the contrary, the “macro fundamentals” are very significant in explaining the 
dynamics of deposits by bank. Devaluation risk, measured by the spread of peso to 
dollar interest rates as well as the change in international reserves are very significant 
and have the correct sing. An even stronger result is that the lagged values of the change 
in the industrial production index, a variable that gives account of the cyclical position 
of the economy, is also very significant (up to the third lag) and has a negative sign. 
These results support our hypothesis that this crisis, contrary to Tequila, was driven by a 
perception of increasing macroeconomic fragility rather than caused by the belief of 
individual banks’ weaknesses spread to the whole financial system  through contagion 
effects. The change in industrial production could be thought as a leading indicator of a 
future downturn in asset prices in the sense of Allen and Gale (op. cit.).  
Dummy variables were used to control for group effects and slope changes. The group 
effect were not significant in this case, probably due to non systematic behavior among 
groups during the whole period. The multiplicative dummies controlling for slope were 
very significant and have the expected signs, capturing the dramatic changes of slope 
for the previously mentioned periods. We also introduced a multiplicative dummy 
variable, controlling for asymmetries in the behavior of the dependent variable. This 
dummy takes the value of the change in deposits in t-1 if the change in t is positive, and 
cero otherwise. The sign of this dummy is negative, indicating that when deposits 
increase the autoregressive process is less persistent. This result is interpreted as a 
signal that depositors are more worried about the past trend in deposits when they are 
falling than when they are growing.  
The model passes the Sargan test of over-identification and the second order 
autocorrelation test, indicating that the GMM estimators are consistent. 
Summing up, in this model for the whole sample, devaluation risk, the change in 
international reserves and industrial production are main factors driving deposit 
dynamics, supporting our hypothesis. 
 
4.2. Modeling bank run episodes 
In this section we study the particularities of the four bank run episodes in which the 
crisis evolved until the “Corralito” was imposed on November 30th. Bank group figures 
(see Table 1) suggested that depositors behavior was not homogeneous between the 
different sub –periods. Our aim here is to obtain an insight of the particular 
characteristics of each episode as the crisis developed. 
Thus we estimated equation (1) using daily data on individual banks’ change in deposits 
for the sub-periods described above. 
The results of the estimation are presented in Tables 4 to 7 for the different sub-periods. 
The model for the first period is presented in Table 4, the only significant micro 
fundamental is the leverage ratio. Contrary to the results obtained for the whole period, 
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the interest rate on deposits was significant with a lag structure, but with a positive sign, 
giving evidence that during this first period, paying higher interest rates helped banks to 
retain deposits. The macro fundamentals, including devaluation risk, the change in 
international reserves and systemic liquidity are all significant  and have the expected 
sign. The only dummy variable that was significant in this period is the one that controls 
for asymmetries. Taking into account that deposits’ fall in this first period was 
insignificant compared to the following episodes, the fact that the interest rate has a 
positive impact on the change in deposits suggests that economic agents confidence on 
the financial system had not been completely eroded yet.  
Table 4  - First Period – Daily Observations 
from 11/08/00 to 12/13/00 
 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data                Number of obs      =       476 
Group variable (i): codent                      Number of groups   =        26 
 
                                                Wald chi2(19)      =   4516.75 
 
Time variable (t): time                         min number of obs  =         8 
                                                max number of obs  =        20 
                                                mean number of obs =  18.30769 
One-step results 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
Dep Change   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dep Change   | 
          LD |  -.6459734   .1135328    -5.69   0.000    -.8684935   -.4234533 
         L2D |  -.6454655   .1170926    -5.51   0.000    -.8749628   -.4159681 
         L3D |  -.4677003   .0933925    -5.01   0.000    -.6507462   -.2846543 
         L4D |  -.3981674   .0925531    -4.30   0.000     -.579568   -.2167667 
         L5D |  -.3034846   .0920131    -3.30   0.001    -.4838269   -.1231423 
Dep Int Rate | 
          D1 |   .0727898    .203079     0.36   0.720    -.3252377    .4708173 
          LD |   .3516222    .189353     1.86   0.063    -.0195029    .7227472 
         L2D |   .3068665   .1546592     1.98   0.047       .00374    .6099929 
         L3D |   .2983707   .1359794     2.19   0.028      .031856    .5648854 
Deval Risk   | 
          D1 |  -.2226788   .1342032    -1.66   0.097    -.4857122    .0403545 
          LD |  -.3918897   .1566555    -2.50   0.012    -.6989289   -.0848506 
         L2D |  -.4389779   .2520321    -1.74   0.082    -.9329517     .054996 
         L3D |  -.2577236   .1427089    -1.81   0.071    -.5374279    .0219807 
IntRes Change| 
          LD |   .1612177   .0942067     1.71   0.087    -.0234239    .3458594 
         L2D |   .2369829   .1122355     2.11   0.035     .0170053    .4569604 
         L3D |   .1593973   .0970687     1.64   0.101    -.0308538    .3496485 
SysLiq Change| 
          D1 |   .0957938   .0484035     1.98   0.048     .0009247    .1906629 
Leverage(-2) | 
          D1 |  -.0108463   .0060503    -1.79   0.073    -.0227047    .0010121 
Asymmetry    |  -.2397502   .1583844    -1.51   0.130    -.5501779    .0706775 
Constant     |  -.0010456   .0004382    -2.39   0.017    -.0019044   -.0001867 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Two-step results 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:      
         chi2(158) =     1.74     Prob > chi2 = 1.0000 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -1.85   Pr > z = 0.0650 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =   1.13   Pr > z = 0.2573 
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The model for the second period (Table 5) is a bit different. In this case the interest rate 
was not significant and the only individual bank variables that are relevant in explaining 
the change in deposits are the government debt ratio and again, the leverage. With 
respect to the macro fundamentals the only one that continues to be significant is 
devaluation risk.  In this model the dummy variable for the five largest retail banks is 
significant and positive indicating that this group lost less deposits than the average, 
giving some evidence of a flight to quality. 
Table 5  - Second Period – Daily Observations 
from 02/12/01 to 03/30/01 
 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data                Number of obs      =       870 
Group variable (i): codent                      Number of groups   =        30 
 
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =   1267.20 
 
Time variable (t): time                         min number of obs  =        29 
                                                max number of obs  =        29 
                                                mean number of obs =        29 
One-step results 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
Dep Change   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dep Change   | 
          LD |  -.3166915    .100053    -3.17   0.002    -.5127918   -.1205913 
         L2D |  -.2707788   .0432734    -6.26   0.000    -.3555931   -.1859645 
         L3D |  -.1859552   .0421635    -4.41   0.000    -.2685941   -.1033162 
         L4D |  -.1891614   .0534959    -3.54   0.000    -.2940115   -.0843113 
Deval Risk   | 
          LD |  -.0660656   .0366936    -1.80   0.072    -.1379838    .0058526 
         L2D |  -.0406485   .0328709    -1.24   0.216    -.1050743    .0237772 
Pub Debt(-1) | 
          D1 |  -.1835882   .0624535    -2.94   0.003    -.3059948   -.0611816 
Leverage(-2) | 
          D1 |  -.0122093   .0048107    -2.54   0.011    -.0216381   -.0027805 
Private5     |   .0009426   .0005402     1.74   0.081    -.0001163    .0020014 
Asymmetry    |  -.6215962   .1088128    -5.71   0.000    -.8348654   -.4083269 
Constant     |  -.0004793   .0003554    -1.35   0.178    -.0011758    .0002173 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Two-step results  
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:      
         chi2(112) =    19.88     Prob > chi2 = 1.0000 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -2.19   Pr > z = 0.0288 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =   0.47   Pr > z = 0.6397 
 
In the third period (Table 6) the interest rate is again significant and positive and the 
leverage ratio is also relevant. Our interpretation is that this leverage ratio can be 
considered as a measure of the perceived solvency of banks. As the quality of banks 
assets deteriorated due to increasing devaluation and default risk, those bank with a 
higher leverage would be in a weaker position. With respect to the macro fundamentals, 
once again devaluation risk persist to be significant. In this case the change in systemic 
liquidity is also relevant. Contrary to the previous episodes, the group that lost the less 
were the largest public banks.  
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Table 6  - Third Period – Daily Observations 
from 07/04/01 to 08/22/01 
 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data                Number of obs      =       723 
Group variable (i): codent                      Number of groups   =        28 
 
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =   1845.87 
 
Time variable (t): time                         min number of obs  =         1 
                                                max number of obs  =        30 
                                                mean number of obs =  25.82143 
One-step results 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
Dep Change   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dep Change   | 
          LD |  -.3469842   .0661647    -5.24   0.000    -.4766646   -.2173038 
         L2D |  -.1826099    .068657    -2.66   0.008    -.3171752   -.0480446 
         L3D |  -.1346133   .0452388    -2.98   0.003    -.2232798   -.0459469 
         L4D |  -.1065248   .0284041    -3.75   0.000    -.1621959   -.0508537 
Dep Int Rate | 
          D1 |   .0964243   .0492484     1.96   0.050    -.0001008    .1929493 
Deval Risk   | 
          LD |   -.032269   .0123976    -2.60   0.009    -.0565679   -.0079701 
SysLiq Change| 
          D1 |   .0689191   .0456031     1.51   0.131    -.0204613    .1582995 
          LD |   .0392999   .0231812     1.70   0.090    -.0061344    .0847342 
Leverage(-2) | 
          D1 |  -.0174148   .0095049    -1.83   0.067     -.036044    .0012145 
Public       |   .0008227   .0004893     1.68   0.093    -.0001364    .0017817 
Asymmetry    |   -.718663   .0936064    -7.68   0.000     -.902128   -.5351979 
Constant     |  -.0011876   .0002985    -3.98   0.000    -.0017726   -.0006026 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Two-step results 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:      
         chi2(241) =    20.71     Prob > chi2 = 1.0000 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -1.66   Pr > z = 0.0978 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =   1.17   Pr > z = 0.2435 
 
Finally, in the four period (Table 7), neither the interest rate nor the micro fundamentals 
were significant. This is a strong result indicating that the crisis evolved to a more 
systemic process not related to particular bank characteristics. On the other hand, the 
macro fundamentals continued being relevant to explain deposit behavior. In this case 
devaluation risk is measured by NDF. This is the only period in which the EMBI spread 
was significant. Both  group effect variables were significant indicating that while the 
largest private banks were  the ones that lost the most, the largest public banks lost the 
less.  
All these models pass the Sargan test of over-identification restrictions and the second 
order autocorrelation test, indicating that the GMM estimators are consistent. 
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Table 7  - Fourth Period – Daily Observations 
from 10/03/01 to 11/30/01 
 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data                Number of obs      =      1110 
Group variable (i): codent                      Number of groups   =        30 
 
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =   1803.60 
 
Time variable (t): time                         min number of obs  =        37 
                                                max number of obs  =        37 
                                                mean number of obs =        37 
One-step results 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
Dep Change   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dep Change   | 
          LD |   -.220858   .0449721    -4.91   0.000    -.3090017   -.1327143 
         L2D |  -.2720538   .0722088    -3.77   0.000    -.4135805    -.130527 
         L3D |  -.1026443   .0657284    -1.56   0.118    -.2314697     .026181 
         L4D |  -.1261124   .0349455    -3.61   0.000    -.1946042   -.0576205 
         L5D |   -.055883   .0250947    -2.23   0.026    -.1050676   -.0066984 
EMBI         | 
          LD |  -.1818074   .0622165    -2.92   0.003    -.3037494   -.0598653 
Non Del Fwd  | 
          D1 |  -.0229458   .0064318    -3.57   0.000    -.0355519   -.0103397 
IntRes Change| 
         L4D |   .0792465    .024183     3.28   0.001     .0318488    .1266443 
Private5     |  -.0009237   .0004354    -2.12   0.034    -.0017771   -.0000703 
Public       |   .0008638    .000426     2.03   0.043     .0000288    .0016988 
Asymmetry    |  -.4179107   .1254384    -3.33   0.001    -.6637654   -.1720559 
Constant     |    .000331   .0005169     0.64   0.522    -.0006822    .0013441 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Two-step results 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:      
         chi2(143) =    16.20     Prob > chi2 = 1.0000 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -2.20   Pr > z = 0.0281 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0: 
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =   1.37   Pr > z = 0.1700 
 
Common features among the four periods are that macro variables are the main 
explanation of deposit changes while micro fundamentals do not appear to contribute to 
explain the crisis dynamics. In particular, devaluation risk is persistently very 
significant. Another relevant feature is that the asymmetry dummy variable correctly 
captures the different intensity of the autoregressive process of deposits dynamics 
according to the deepness of the fall in each episode.  
Concluding, the results for the whole sample are confirmed by those obtained for the 
different sub-samples.  
 
5.Conclusions 
 
We studied the dynamics of individual bank deposits during the twin crisis suffered by 
Argentina since November 2000. Our aim was to determine to what extent this event 
had the characteristics of a “sun spot” phenomenon -i.e. a random event not related to 
the real economy- or, it was the consequence of a change in economic agents perception 
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about the trend of the Argentine economy.-i.e. an increase on aggregate risk. We were 
interested on determining if the highly dollarized loan portfolios of banks, as well as the 
large proportion of public debt in banks´ asset portfolios, induced depositors to 
massively run on banks as they perceived that their solvency was worsening. 
The empirical results strongly favour the second hypothesis. Macro fundamentals and in 
particular devaluation risk and the change in industrial production, as a leading indicator 
of future banks’ solvency problems  played an important roll in explaining the 
behaviour of deposits during the crisis. On the contrary, banks’  micro fundamentals” 
did not help to explain the dynamics of deposits, except for a leverage ratio.  
We think that our findings support the assessment that the regulatory framework built 
up during the 1990 had non trivial weaknesses. The currency board regime favoured the 
perception that debtors would be permanently protected against devaluation risk, 
inducing a high dollarization of banking sector assets. On the other hand, the 
combination of a currency board regime and a deposit insurance system that did not 
discriminate between both, domestic and foreign currency, also favoured dollarization 
of deposits. The need of regulations to control for the implied solvency risk by 
generated by the high dollarization of banks’ assets was underestimated. More strict 
regulations on banks’ government debt holdings, preventing for excessive default risk 
taking by financial institutions,  were also necessary. given the financing restrictions 
imposed to the government by the “ Convertibilidad”.  
Although it is perhaps early to intend to build policy lessons from the present 
experience of Argentina, there are some policy recommendations appear quite 
straightforward: First, a key  element to allow for a deepening of the banking system is 
to develop attractive financial instruments in the domestic currency.  Second, given that 
financial systems are subject to currency risk, independently of the exchange rate 
regime adopted, regulations must control for this risk. Possible recommendations for a 
good regulation design could be, in our opinion: (i)  regulations must make depositors 
aware of the higher risk involved in foreign currency deposits,  since the Central Bank 
does not have policy instruments to act as a LOLR in this case, (ii)  restrictions must be 
introduced on bank lending in foreign currency, discouraging excessive growth of 
foreign currency financing and ensuring a matching between currency denomination of 
loans and banks’ borrowers income (iii)  the sovereign debt risk of banks’ asset 
portfolios must also be controlled.  
Latest experiences of emerging market crises and, more specifically, the present 
Argentinean crisis, made clear that financial liberalization policies must be 
accompanied by regulations that widely control for banks’ risk, and prevent excessive 
credit expansion. Emerging market economies, probably because of a lack of domestic 
savings to sustain growth, are very dependent on capital inflows. In this sense banking 
systems in emerging markets face particular risks not shared by those of mature 
economies. As a consequence, the regulatory standards for emerging economies’ 
banking systems need to be revised in light of recent experiences, including this of 
Argentina and might probably depart in some aspects from those of developed 
countries. 
 25 
Appendix A: Spearman Correlations 
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Dep Change EMBI Deval Risk Non Del Fwd IntRes Change SysLiq Change
Dep Change 1
EMBI -0,251 1
Deval Risk -0,132 -0,154 1
Non Del Fwd 0,034     0.692*** -0,081 1
IntReq Change 0,049  -0.339* 0,155 -0.380* 1
SysLiq Change 0,064   -0.428** 0,116 -0.304    0.796*** 1
Dep Change EMBI Deval Risk Non Del Fwd IntRes Change SysLiq Change
Dep Change 1
EMBI -0,284 1
Deval Risk -0,286     0.840*** 1
Non Del Fwd   -0.362**    0.945***    0.875*** 1
IntRes Change 0,246   -0.498***  -0.390**    -0.439*** 1
SysLiq Change 0,198 -0,244 -0,181 -0.183    0.508*** 1
Dep Change EMBI Deval Risk Non Del Fwd IntRes Change SysLiq Change
Dep Change 1
EMBI -0.117 1
Deval Risk -0.047     0.522*** 1
Non Del Fwd 0.083     0.587*** 0.255 1
IntRes Change    0.428***  -0.279* -0.016 -0,047 1
SysLiq Change    0.583*** -0.211 -0.015 -0,027    0.796*** 1
Dep Change EMBI Deval Risk Non Del Fwd IntRes Change SysLiq Change
Dep Change 1
EMBI -0.289* 1
Deval Risk -0.156  0.378** 1
Non Del Fwd -0.226   0.636*** -0.041 1
IntRes Change  0.257* -0.342**  0.111 -0,045 1
SysLiq Change    0.521*** -0.309** -0.055 -0,066 0.697*** 1
Dep Change EMBI Deval Risk Non Del Fwd IntRes Change SysLiq Change
Dep Change 1
EMBI -0.228* 1
Deval Risk   -0.355***    0.843*** 1
Non Del Fwd -0.217*    0.978***      0.856*** 1
IntRes Change  0.275**  -0.283**  -0.198*     -0.301*** 1
SysLiq Change   0.457*** -0.163 -0.132 -0.151 0.771*** 1
*** Indicates statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
First Period - Daily Observations from 11/08/00 to 12/13/00
Observations = 26
Second Period - Daily Observations from 02/12/01 to 03/30/01
Observations = 43
Whole Sample Period - Weekly Observations
Observations = 74
Observations = 34
Third Period - Daily Observations from 07/04/01 to 08/22/01
Observations = 35
Fourth Period - Daily Observations from 10/03/01 to 11/30/01
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